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INTRODUCTION
 A critical issue in trying to clarify and solidify civil recourse theory 
is grasping the nature of the right of action against a tortfeasor and 
its relation to the right that the tortfeasor allegedly violated. With 
this issue in mind—and considering the broader goal of revisiting 
civil recourse theory from the ground up—it may be illuminating to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?  Associate Dean for Research & James H. Quinn Professor, Fordham University 
School of Law. Thanks to Curtis Bridgeman, John Gardner, John Goldberg, Arthur Ripstein, 
Andrew Robertson, Seana Shiffrin, and participants in The Florida State University Law Re-
view Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory, the Melbourne Torts Workshop of February 2011, 
the University of Toronto Legal Theory Workshop, and the UCLA Law and Philosophy Collo-
quium, for helpful comments on a previous draft. 
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examine the set of problems that led me to put forward civil recourse 
theory as an alternative basis for a general theory of tort law. That is 
provided in Part I, below, in a form that is more autobiographical 
than is customary. 
 Part II surveys the range of issues in tort theory to which civil re-
course theory has led, but does so with the aim of actually honing in 
on certain core issues. The process of focusing on a key normative 
issue is further winnowed down in Part III, which offers both meth-
odological clarifications and quite a general normative account of the 
attributes of tort law, according to the tort theoretic work I have done 
(including, but not limited to, civil recourse theory) both individually 
and with John Goldberg. In doing so, Part III identifies as our ques-
tion: What is the principled justification for the aspect of our legal 
system that recognizes individuals as having a right of action against 
those who wronged them? More specifically, I acknowledge that the 
Principle of Civil Recourse is said to provide a principled justification 
for the state’s empowerment of individuals with private rights of ac-
tion against those who have wronged them. The question is what, in 
such context, the Principle of Civil Recourse really means and in 
what sense it justifies private rights of action. 
 Part IV frames the challenge of the Article by reference to the fol-
lowing disjunctive critique (which is a variation of Arthur Ripstein’s 
critique): Civil recourse theory is unacceptable if it is a variation on a 
revenge theory, and if it is not, it must derive from corrective justice 
theory. If that is so, then either the civil recourse critique of correc-
tive justice theory is unsound (Ripstein’s view), or it is sound, but 
dooms civil recourse theory itself. Part IV indicates my reasons for 
rejecting both revenge-based theories and corrective justice theories. 
Part V begins us down the path of reconstructing civil recourse theo-
ry and acknowledges the influence in the new account of work by 
other scholars: in law (Jason Solomon) and moral philosophy (Ste-
phen Darwall and P.F. Strawson). 
 In many ways, the most significant section of the Article is Part 
VI, which concerns positive morality, and not tort law. Part VI exam-
ines accountability for wrongs and the entitlement of victims of 
wrongs to demand responsive conduct from those who have wronged 
them. The right to demand responsive conduct from a person by 
whom one has been mistreated is distinguished from the right 
against mistreatment. I also argue that the right to demand respon-
sive conduct is not derivative of a duty to provide responsive conduct 
to those whom one has wronged. 
 Finally, Part VII returns to the law of torts, utilizing the account 
developed in Part VI to give force and substance to the normative ba-
sis of the Principle of Civil Recourse. In so doing, it explains why civil 
recourse theory is fundamentally distinct both from corrective justice 
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theories and from vengeance-based theories. The conclusion brings 
me back to the idea of substantive standing, with which I begin. 
I. CIVIL RECOURSE AND THE PROBLEM OF SUBSTANTIVE STANDING
 Contemplating fraud (theoretically, not practically) was the be-
ginning of my thinking about civil recourse and relational wrongs, for 
there is a philosophical problem buried in the law of fraud that I 
came across as a practicing lawyer in 1993. Fraud doctrine contains a 
rule stating that a plaintiff has no cause of action in fraud without 
proof that he or she relied upon the fraudulent representation of the 
defendant. The intuitively obvious explanation of the rule is that a 
person has not been defrauded by the defendant, even indirectly, unless 
he or she acted because of being deceived by the defendant’s fraudu-
lent representation or concealment. A claim for fraud is essentially 
predicated on the idea that one was defrauded by the defendant. 
 Tort scholars and corporate law scholars know that this rule has 
kinks in it, some old and some new, some in the common law and 
some in common law descendants such as federal securities fraud 
(which softens reliance by fraud-on-the-market doctrine1). Since 
1993, I have written a lot about those kinks; most notably, my coau-
thors John Goldberg and Tony Sebok and I have together written a 
whole article on the place of reliance in fraud, and much of it focuses 
on the kinks in the rule.2 However, since the beginning I have main-
tained the view that the rule basically still exists in quite a strong 
form, and that, except in consumer law (and perhaps even there), the 
exceptions do not swallow the rule. More to the point, whatever 
change has occurred goes no distance in persuading me that the rule 
was simply a mistake or tort doctrine’s crude way of making another 
point. My sense then and my sense now is that the reliance rule 
carves at the joints of a cogent notion of a claim for fraud. 
 And yet the reliance rule is a problem for instrumentalist theories 
and for a range of noninstrumentalist theories, too. Deterrence, com-
pensation, and fairness rationales give the reliance requirement no 
place at all or a highly contingent and frequently defeated place. 
Rosen v. Spanierman,3 an unremarkable Second Circuit case from 
1990, is a good example. The plaintiff provided money to a couple so 
that they could buy a special piece of art on the occasion of their 
wedding.4 The couple bought a work of art from an art dealer who 
represented it as an authentic work by an accomplished artist, which 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 1.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). 
 2.  See generally John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1001 (2006). 
 3.  894 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 4.  Id. at 30. 
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it turned out not to be.5 The plaintiff sued the dealer for fraud but 
lost because the plaintiff did not rely on any representations by the 
dealer.6 From a deterrent, compensatory, and fairness point of view, 
the result seems wrong. But while the plaintiff may have been 
harmed, she was not defrauded. 
 I have always conceptualized the point as follows: Fraud is a wrong, 
and a wrong is a doing of a sort that has two ends to it—in classical 
terms, an agent end and a patient end. The patient end of the wrong of 
fraud involves being deceived by the misrepresentation of the defend-
ant. If this piece of the picture is absent, then what is in front of the 
court in the plaintiff’s lawsuit is not a well-formed version of the tort of 
fraud. There may be some other wrong with the defendant’s conduct on 
the one end and the plaintiff’s injury on the other. Or, it may be that we 
should rethink or expand what we want to understand fraud to be. Or, 
it may be that we want to stick some provisions into the law so that one 
gets to recover money even though one has not actually been defrauded. 
There is nothing odd about a court starting with the presumption that 
it is not going to do any of the variations above; that it simply wants to 
know whether it has a common law fraud claim in front of it. And, if 
that is in fact the question the court is exploring, then the answer is 
that plaintiff reliance is required. 
 I have always thought of this part of the analysis as the easier 
part, and I still do. By that, I do not mean to suggest that it is easy, 
just that it is less difficult than what comes next. What comes next is 
of course the question: Who cares? Why does it matter whether the 
plaintiff was defrauded? She is not asking for a declaratory judgment 
about the contours of the tort of fraud as a two-sided wrong. She is 
asking for money because she was injured, and she was injured be-
cause of the defendant’s fraudulent conduct in a fairly direct way. 
Why is it relevant whether she was defrauded? Doesn’t this in fact 
beg the question? 
 Here, I felt, and still feel today, that there we have the earmarks 
of a true philosophical question, one that lies at the philosophical 
foundations of private law and perhaps deeper than that. I do not 
mean by this that the question is clearly important. On the contrary, 
the problem seemed to me like other philosophical problems in the 
following respect: I could not actually tell whether it was important 
at all, because there seemed to me some chance that it was vacuous 
to say that one has a right of action in fraud only if one was defraud-
ed. If it was not vacuous, then it would indeed be fundamental. But 
anyone who wanted to reject the view that it was vacuous would have 
to explain why not. Then he would have to say what it means. And 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 36. 
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then he would have to say what justification or rationale could be put 
forward in support of it. Doing all three of these—or, for that matter, 
any one—seemed to me a very challenging task. 
All of this I decided before I even entered the legal academy. It was 
my good fortune that when I began teaching law at the University of 
Pittsburgh, I was asked to teach a course on defamation and privacy, 
for the law of defamation turned out to help me with this new research 
project. A plaintiff does not have a claim in libel unless the defendant 
made a statement about him or her—“of and concerning” the plaintiff, 
as the common law puts it.7 So, imagine a woman in small town U.S.A. 
whose husband is the coach of the girls basketball team at the high 
school. The town newspaper publishes a story saying that the husband 
has been having sex with the girls on the team. If the wife—who ac-
cepts her husband’s avowals of innocence—sues the newspaper on the 
ground that its false and libelous statements have caused her to be 
emotionally tormented and shunned in her town, she will be subject to 
a motion to dismiss under the common law of libel, regardless of any 
evidence regarding the truth or falsity of the story.8 That is because her 
claim is missing the “of and concerning” element.  
This struck me as yet another case illustrating a basic feature of 
the law: A plaintiff does not have a libel claim unless she herself was 
defamed; that she was foreseeably injured by the defendant’s defam-
atory statement is not enough. Libel, like fraud, is a two-ended 
wrong, and a plaintiff has no claim unless she is at the patient end of 
the wrong, and that means the defendant’s defamatory attack must 
have been a defamatory attack upon her. Although hardly the best 
known feature of libel law, the “of and concerning” element is far 
from obscure; the failure of Commissioner Sullivan to satisfy that 
element was indeed a significant feature of Justice Brennan’s land-
mark opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan.9
 During my year in Pittsburgh, I became aware of the growing lit-
erature on the philosophical foundations of tort law, especially the 
work of Jules Coleman, Ernest Weinrib, and Stephen Perry. I was 
heartened to learn that relationality was understood to be highly sig-
nificant. And Ernest Weinrib’s words on Palsgraf10 and correlativity 
were, of course, music to my ears.11 For I saw that Palsgraf is in neg-
ligence law what the reliance and “of and concerning” cases are in 
fraud and defamation: The defendant must have breached a duty of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 7.  See, e.g., Dean v. Dearing, 561 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Va. 2002). 
 8.  Cf. Johnson v. Sw. Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating 
that a wife has no independent libel cause of action for injury allegedly resulting from state-
ments about her husband’s football coach’s conduct in precipitating brawl).  
 9.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 10.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 11.  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989). 
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nonnegligence owed to the plaintiff; negligent conduct injuring the 
plaintiff is not enough. As I began to lay out what I regard as many of 
the most difficult doctrinal problems in negligence law, I saw that 
many of them involved essentially the same puzzle. An investor who 
loses money because an accountant breached a duty of care owed to 
his client could not (until the past few decades) recover from the ac-
countant, because the accountant did not breach a duty of care owed 
to the defendant.12 The requirement of a nexus between breach and 
duty within negligence law is the analogue of reliance in fraud and 
“of and concerning” in defamation. 
 The general rule of which each of these is an instance (I came to 
believe) is the rule that a plaintiff does not have a tort claim against 
a defendant whose tortious conduct injured her unless the defend-
ant’s conduct was wrongful relative to the plaintiff in the manner 
specified under the law of the tort in question.  
 I coined a term to help articulate this idea: “substantive standing.” 
The idea is that every tort has a requirement that the defendant’s 
conduct be wrongful relative to the plaintiff in a particular way: reli-
ance in fraud, “of and concerning” in defamation, breach-duty nexus 
in negligence, possessory interest in property torts, and so on. Be-
cause this is a requirement concerning the plaintiff’s injury that can 
defeat a claim even if the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the de-
fendant committed the tortious action, I called it a standing require-
ment. Because it demands certain substantive content in the nature 
of a plaintiff’s injury, I called it the “substantive” standing require-
ment. Substantive standing refers to the aspect of a plaintiff’s injury 
being of a certain sort relative to the wrong. A substantive standing 
requirement is simply a rule that a plaintiff does not have a tort 
claim of a certain sort unless she has substantive standing (for that 
tort). My first torts article began by making a detailed doctrinal ar-
gument that every tort has a substantive standing requirement with-
in it.13 Incidentally, I was in part drawn to the idea of substantive 
standing because my work as a lawyer in antitrust law had educated 
me about the existence of a nonprocedural “standing” element in pri-
vate antitrust actions. 
 Three difficult questions presented themselves, as suggested ear-
lier: First, is it vacuous to say that the plaintiff has no fraud claim 
unless the defendant defrauded her; the plaintiff has no negligence 
claim unless the defendant breached a duty of care owed to her . . . 
and so on? More generally, is it vacuous to say that a plaintiff has no 
claim for a wrong unless the defendant’s wronging was a wrong to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 12.  Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
 13.  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (1998). 
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her in the relevant sense? Second, what does such a statement mean? 
Third, if it is not vacuous, what is the rationale for it? These were the 
three questions on fraud, now broadened to all of torts. The working 
paper, at the time, was called “Substantive Standing in the Law of 
Torts.” It will be convenient to rephrase the questions as I did then: 
Are substantive standing requirements vacuous? If not, what do they 
mean? And what is the justification for requiring substantive standing? 
 I ended up giving answers to all three questions, both in their par-
ticular forms and in their more general forms. These are the answers 
I would offer today, too. They go roughly as follows: 
1. Substantive standing rules are not vacuous because there are 
ways of specifying the content of the conduct by the defend-
ant, the injury of the plaintiff, and the manner in which the 
conduct and injury are connected, which can be articulated 
independently of raising the question of whether the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover from the defendant. 
2. Substantive standing rules presuppose a certain kind of norm 
of conduct—a relational directive—that constitutes the fount 
of the normativity of each tort. The structure of such direc-
tives is that they contemplate a domain of agents and a do-
main of patients and they envision a kind of wronging by the 
agent of the patient—X defrauds Y. These wrongs are mis-
treatments of one person by another; they are relational 
wrongs that are envisioned. Substantive standing rules pre-
suppose that tort law contains relational normative directives 
enjoining the potential agents from mistreating the potential 
patients in this way. They are, to use a term of Dale Nance’s 
(drawing upon Hart, paralleling Coleman and Kraus, and 
contesting Calabresi and Melamed), more like “guidance 
rules” than “enforcement rules.”14 As I suggested in that pa-
per and argued in several subsequent pieces,?the presence of a 
kind of injunctive force in these directives does not require 
adoption of a noncognitive metaethics, or the rejection of an 
objectivist jurisprudence. Although the existence of the legal 
directives is a different issue from their merit, the enterprise 
of identifying rights, duties, and directives in the law of torts 
is a hermeneutical one undertaken within the (not exactingly 
or exclusively defined) domain of legal discourse, not the sort 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 14.  Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathe-
dral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 861 (1997). Nance expressly draws from H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 88 (1961), Nance, supra, at 859-60, and notes the complementary nature of 
Jules Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986), 
Nance, supra, at 840. As Nance’s title indicates, his article is put forward as a critique of Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1072).  Nance, supra, at 840. 
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of head-counting enterprise that, for example, Dworkin often 
attributes to Hart.15 A right of action in tort is a power to ob-
tain redress from another person through the courts. Sub-
stantive standing rules say that a right of action for P in a 
certain tort T against D is dependent upon D’s having done 
the tort T upon P in the manner enjoined by the relational di-
rective corresponding to the tort T; that P has a right of action 
for T against D only if P was among those upon whom D was 
enjoined not to commit T, and D did commit T upon P. 
3. Rights of action under tort law supply an avenue of civil re-
course for the plaintiff against one who wronged the plaintiff. 
The power to redress the legal wrong done to oneself is sup-
plied by the state pursuant to a duty of the state to provide 
some avenue of recourse to those who have been wronged. It 
is civil recourse in three senses: it is civil as opposed to being 
barbaric, civil opposed to being criminal, and civil as opposed 
to being independent of the structure of law. 
 What seemed capable of solving the problem was a principle of 
civil recourse: A person who has been legally wronged is entitled to 
an avenue of civil recourse against the wrongdoer. Blackstone’s and 
Locke’s major statements on private law each contain what are fairly 
regarded as antecedents of the same idea, embraced from a norma-
tive point of view, more than a doctrinal one.16 The interpretive claim 
was that the common law of torts contains a principle of civil re-
course and that causes of action in tort are provided by the state as a 
way of complying with the principle of civil recourse. Against a back-
drop according to which a person is presumptively not entitled to the 
state’s assistance in acting civilly against a private party for a money 
judgment or for an order that another private person act in some 
way, there was a sort of negative rule of recourse: A person is not en-
titled to a right of action in tort against another unless that other 
committed a legal wrong against her. 
 All of this was published in my article Rights, Wrongs, and Re-
course in the Law of Torts in Vanderbilt Law Review.17 I felt I had the 
interpretive explanation for my fraud puzzle, as well as those in libel, 
and substantive standing in each tort, including negligence. I felt I 
had generated an adequate explanation of Palsgraf. And I had ar-
gued, and still believe, that the existence of substantive standing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 15.  Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 869-74 (1972) 
(describing and criticizing Hart’s concept of social rules, which relies upon social facts about 
the actions that are in fact taken by numerous members of the community). 
 16.  Cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 637-42 (J. Coleman & S. Shapiro eds. 2002) 
(setting forth Blackstonian and Lockean roots of civil recourse theory).  
 17.  See Zipursky, supra note 13. 
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rules constituted substantial evidence against the interpretive ade-
quacy of other leading frameworks, including the most common vari-
ants of law and economics and corrective justice theory. 
II. CIVIL RECOURSE, RELATIONAL WRONGS, AND                                  
TORT THEORY MORE BROADLY
 The development of a conception of torts in terms of relational 
wrongs and civil recourse theory were thus in significant part a re-
sponse to the problem of explaining what I had dubbed the “substan-
tive standing” requirement. John Goldberg and I have developed the 
framework of relational wrongs and civil recourse theory and several 
related projects collaboratively since then. Let me turn now to the 
subsequent projects. 
 First, there is a family of interpretive and doctrinal projects about 
the wrongs of tort doctrine.18 If tort law is all about relational wrongs, 
what are the wrongs, and what explains the contours of those 
wrongs? For example, why aren’t there duties to safeguard another 
person’s emotional well-being, absent a special relationship, within 
negligence law?19 Why is the wrong of fraud constructed so that it is 
all about deception, rather than all about not hurting someone 
through deception? Why is proof of actual harm essential to the 
wrong in some cases—negligence—but not others—libel? What is the 
nature of the fault, if any, at the core of various wrongs? And so on. 
Explaining why the duty element of negligence has the contours it 
does; why the relational wrong of negligence, and the relational di-
rective underlying it, has the content it does—is the project John 
Goldberg and I first undertook in The Moral of MacPherson,20 which 
John and I started writing together before I had finished writing (and 
long before I had published) Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law 
of Torts. Broadly speaking, it is the project of understanding from an 
interpretive point of view what the normative principles are underly-
ing the primary rights and duties of the several torts. We have ar-
gued that an across-the-board instrumentalist approach to explaining 
where tort law draws its lines will not work. 
 A second set of projects is again doctrinal and goes to the subject 
of remedies. If the principle of civil recourse is what drives the idea of 
a right of action, does it explain why the right of action is for compen-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 18.  See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO 
U.S. LAW: TORTS (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as 
Wrongs].
 19.  See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1625 (2002). 
 20.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1733 (1998). 
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satory damages in most cases, but not in all cases? If not, what does 
explain that? The question of whether there is a right of action and a 
right to redress does not answer what the remedies shall be, or why. 
John Goldberg and I have both done substantial work on this ques-
tion, both individually21 and jointly.22 Corrective justice theorists are 
right to pay attention to the idea of making whole, but this is less 
clear, less literal, less exclusive, and less foundational than they have 
realized. Rather, it is principally relevant to what remedies are 
available and why, not to the question of why there should be private 
rights of action and tort liability at all. 
 Third, there were questions of intellectual history and legal history: 
Where does the idea of civil recourse come from? How deep is its role in 
Anglo-American tort law? Where does it fit into the political theoretical 
framework of thought underlying Anglo-American tort law? What are 
its roots in American tort law? John and I, in The Moral of MacPher-
son, deepened the project of explaining Cardozo as holding a view of 
relational duty that fit into the framework that I had articulated for
Palsgraf and more generally into civil recourse theory.23 The best arti-
cle on the place of civil recourse in English and American legal history 
asserts that it was central both in the history of the common law and in 
the thinking of the framers of the American Constitution.24
 Fourth, there are also two projects that are in some sense method-
ological: one pertaining to the nature of common law explanation and 
to the nature of the common law itself, and one pertaining to the 
normative theory of adjudication in the common law. We have not 
always been as careful as we might in distinguishing these. The first 
I have labeled “pragmatic conceptualism”;25 it is the position that le-
gal explanations of parts of the common law lay bare the inferential 
structure of the concepts that inhere in various parts of the common 
law, and that what it is for various concepts to inhere in the common 
law is for there to be a set of practices of deciding cases various ways 
based upon the content of the cases. The concepts are in a sense 
nodes in the practices; the explanation of the concepts is, in a sense, 
simply an elucidation of the practices. The second, normative theory 
of adjudication we initially called “conceptualistic pragmatism.”26 It 
rests upon the assertion that judges ought to engage in the Cardozo-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 21.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compen-
sation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages,
84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 22.  See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18. 
 23.  See id.
 24.  John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right 
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005). 
 25.  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000). 
 26.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 690 (1998); Goldberg & Zipursky supra note 19, at 1717. 
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like practice of shaping the common law as one understands its role 
in real life, but doing so in a manner that preserves the structure of 
the concepts that give the law content and form. 
 My principal goals in the main parts of this Article are distinct 
from all of the above. I aim to deepen the analysis of the idea of civil 
recourse and also to deepen the account of the set of principles and val-
ues underlying the basic structure of tort doctrine. I mean to show 
how a set of normative ideas is plausibly viewed as the set to which 
our system is committed insofar as it provides and applies a common 
law of torts, and I mean to place that set of ideas in its best light. It is 
quite important to frame our central question considerably more narrow-
ly, however. Doing so will require two further stage-setting exercises. 
III.   METHODOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS
A.   Rights of Action and Civil Recourse 
 Part of what I (and John Goldberg) have sought to explain is what 
I shall now call “The Right of Action Principle”: An individual who 
was legally wronged is prima facie entitled to a right of action against 
the wrongdoer. The first, and most doctrinally basic, assertion of civil 
recourse theory we have put forward is that the common law of torts 
is comprised in part by the Right of Action Principle.27 This might be 
called the “Right of Action Metastatement.” The Right of Action Prin-
ciple does not itself utilize either the phrase “civil recourse” or the 
concept of civil recourse, nor does the Right of Action Metastatement. 
Note that this paragraph has somewhat confusingly worked at two 
different levels: a level that is about rights of action and wrongs (The 
Right of Action Principle), and a level that is about the common law 
of torts (The Right of Action Metastatement). 
 In my original article, I articulated the Principle of Civil Recourse: 
One who has been wronged by another is entitled to an avenue of re-
course against the wrongdoer.28 Relatedly, an important assertion about 
tort law within civil recourse theory is that the common law of torts is 
comprised in part by the Principle of Civil Recourse. This might be 
called the “Civil Recourse Metastatement.” The evidentiary basis for 
the Civil Recourse Metastatement is the Right of Action Metastate-
ment, because the Right of Action Metastatement is more doctrinally 
basic than the Civil Recourse Metastatement—i.e., one can arrive at 
the Right of Action Metastatement by gathering appellate decisions, 
analyzing them, and then bringing them together, but one cannot (jus-
tifiably) arrive at the Civil Recourse Metastatement without proceeding 
through the Right of Action Metastatement. On the other hand, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 27.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 
738 (2003). 
 28.  See Zipursky, supra note 13, at 82-90. 
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Principle of Civil Recourse itself is more basic, normatively, than the 
Right of Action Principle; within tort law itself it is part of what justi-
fies the Right of Action Principle, but not vice versa. 
 Although the principal explanatory goal of this Article is to deepen 
the account of the Principle of Civil Recourse and the Right of Action 
Principle, it is important to frame this inquiry within a broader setting. 
To that end, I shall briefly outline a number of kinds of justification 
that might be offered for a legal system, like our own, that permits vic-
tims of wrongs to bring rights of action for torts. It is a sketch of several 
normative defenses of tort law as we have analyzed it (i.e., a system 
that is comprised in part by the Right of Action Principle, in part by a 
set of relational legal directives, and in part by a variety of remedies 
doctrines). The account sets out three different (and mutually con-
sistent) kinds of justification: rights-based justification, constructive 
justification (which are quasi-instrumental), and instrumental justifi-
cation. The point of the outline is to specify more cleanly the normative 
question to be addressed, but to do so in a manner that does not (mis-
leadingly) suggest that the entire value of tort law for our society or 
legal system depends on its providing an avenue of civil recourse. 
B.   Valuable Attributes of a System that Provides                           
Private Rights of Action 
 1.   Identifying the Principle of Civil Recourse 
 The Right of Action Principle, as mentioned, is justified by the 
principle that the victim of a legal wrong is entitled to an avenue of 
civil recourse against the wrongdoer: the Principle of Civil Recourse. 
The Principle of Civil Recourse means that if a plaintiff has been 
wronged the plaintiff is entitled to obtain a judgment against the de-
fendant in tort, for the availability of a judgment is a form of re-
course. The reason for having a right of action is that the affront of 
the tort is properly viewed as a ground for a kind of claim against the 
wrongdoer; so that a victim is not rendered powerless because she 
has a right to proceed against the wrongdoer, through the state. This 
paragraph is deliberately incomplete; much of Parts IV-VI is an effort 
to flesh it out.  
 From a justificatory perspective, several additional points are im-
portant. For heuristic purposes, I shall divide these points into two 
trios, calling the first trio “constructivist justifications” and the se-
cond trio “instrumental justifications.” They are, to be more precise, 
justifications of the provision of rights of action in tort to victims. 
 2.   Constructivist Justifications 
 First, the capacity to understand ourselves as guided by relational 
legal directives of conduct, relational duties, and relational rights, 
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depends in part on a system of accountability that helps us to recog-
nize them and take them seriously. Second, the concrete protection of 
individual goods that the law provides is provided in substantial part 
because there is accountability. Third, the capacity to build law upon 
community morality itself is valuable and turns in part on the capac-
ity of courts to convert socially accepted norms of morality into norms 
of law, and the capacity of actors to sustain norms of responsibility 
and community morality is itself aided by the existence of a publicly 
enforceable set that the parties justifiably regard as quite thin. 
 Whether it be private property or good reputation or security in 
one’s bodily integrity, the individual good would not exist as the sort 
of good it does were there not private rights of action available 
against those who interfered with this good in certain respects. Be-
cause the protection of tort law is among the important legal mecha-
nisms for protecting such goods, one is tempted to refer to such pro-
tection as an instrumental value of tort law. However, this would be 
misleading, for one cannot fully identify the nature or value of such 
goods—rights to private property—without seeing that it comes with 
a bundle of legal protections. The phrase “constructive justification” 
is meant to capture the intermediate status of this kind of justifica-
tion. A similar, constructivist point applies to the role of a system of 
private rights of action in sustaining the legal directives of tort law. 
It would be odd to say that private rights of action are a mere in-
strument for the enforcement of the relational directives of tort law, 
for part of how they maintain their role as accepted norms of conduct 
lies in their being connected to institutional mechanisms of enforce-
ment, and part of what makes them “legal” directives is that they are 
connected with private rights of action. 
 3.   Instrumental Justifications 
 The practices associated with legally enforceable demands of 
wrongdoers for a response—tort law—foster more harmonious inter-
course in society, just as the practices associated with moral demands 
for responsive conduct do. There is an institutional game plan for 
dealing with the injury, expense, indignation, anger, and resentment 
that flow from the legal wrongs that have been visited upon individ-
uals. The state makes its courts available so that victims may use 
them to demand responses from wrongdoers. We are not left to the 
uncertainty of moral demands or the chaos and bedlam of private re-
taliation. Legal demands and legal accountability not only circum-
vent private violence, they also permit healing and reconciliation in 
many cases. It is in part because we have the option of a right of ac-
tion against wrongdoers that individuals and entities have the capac-
ity to move on. These beneficial functions of having private rights of 
action in tort are specified in a manner that does permit one to refer 
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this discussion as offering an instrumental justification. To put the 
point differently, the justifications offered above are such that it is in 
principle cogent to suppose that a different plan for responding to 
wrongs was capable of dealing with the injury, expense, indignation, 
anger, and resentment generated by such wrongs and at fostering 
harmony more effectively, or with less expense or fewer negative re-
percussions, and if there were such a different plan, that would be a 
complete ground for deeming the other system superior, so far as 
those justifications go. 
 Second, by empowering plaintiffs with the right to sue, we are 
generating a system whereby the harshness of accidental injuries 
falling randomly upon the innocent often mitigates the situation. In 
the nineteenth century, tort law became a de facto compensation sys-
tem for those accidentally injured, and it remains a highly significant 
part of the collection of legal mechanisms available to secure com-
pensation for an accidental injury.29 The compensation-function so 
described is also an instrumental justification. Indeed, for most of the 
twentieth century, the instrumentalist compensatory justification 
was literally of “hornbook” status.30
 Finally, of course, by allowing wrongdoers to be held accountable, 
we ensure that the recalcitrant will have greater incentives to comply 
with their duties to others. There are many actors who are not par-
ticularly inclined to comply with norms of conduct simply because 
that is expected of them. For these actors, as for the bad man, it is 
socially valuable to be able to provide a set of incentives for deter-
rence purposes. Posnerian law and economics asserts that tort law is 
best interpreted as a set of institutions that impose liability in order 
to deter actors from socially harmful conduct without generating ex-
cessive costs in the form of diminished activity levels or extravagant 
enforcement or information gathering expenditures.31 John Goldberg 
and I reject this claim, but that does not prevent us from recognizing 
the following: the availability of private rights of action for victims of 
torts serves the salutary function of deterring actors from engaging 
in tortious conduct. 
 4.   Specification of the Question 
 All of the above are valuable attributes of a legal system that al-
lows certain persons who have been mistreated in various ways to 
bring rights of action against those who have so treated them. To the 
extent that a citizen or a legislature is considering altering the law, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 29.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 21-23 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
 30.  Id.
 31.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972). 
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any good reasons for altering the law or eliminating it must be un-
derstood against the backdrop of this larger justificatory account. 
Moreover, insofar as courts properly take their role to be legislative, 
awareness of these features is valuable. Finally, all of these justifica-
tions would be worth articulating insofar as a scholar or lawyer is 
considering questions such as: Why is it good to have tort law? Would 
there be a problem in eliminating or drastically diminishing tort law? 
What would be lost? 
 But Goldberg and I have followed corrective justice theorists, such 
as Weinrib and Coleman, in pursuing a conception of what tort law is 
quite different from that of realists and so-called legal pragmatists.32
Like these thinkers in one way, and like Ronald Dworkin in others, we 
have taken the view that there is a deontic structure to the principles of 
the common law of torts itself.33 Relatedly, a judge purporting to be ar-
ticulating and applying the common law of torts must, in the first in-
stance, decide in accordance with these principles. And so, at least for 
adjudication (as opposed to legislative revision), the most important 
question is not what makes tort law a valuable kind of law to have. The 
most important questions are what the legal principles are, whether 
they hang together as a normative matter, and what gives them what-
ever normative power and plausibility they might have. 
IV.   THE CRITIQUE OF CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY
A.   The Disjunctive Critique of Civil Recourse Theory 
 The effort to put forward a normative account is, in part, framed 
by the desire to respond to critics. One group of critics has argued 
that our putative normative foundation is in fact simply corrective 
justice theory, supplemented by the assertion that it is victims, ra-
ther than the state, that hold the power to crank up the machinery 
that delivers corrective justice, and that (conversely) victims may 
choose not to enforce their rights.34 A second group of critics has ar-
gued that Goldberg and I are really timid vengeance theorists.35 For 
each of these critics, there are those who say that when civil recourse 
theory shows its true colors, it really is justifiable, and so we ought to 
show our true colors, for corrective justice theory really is justifiable 
or vengeance theory really is justifiable.36 Conversely, there are those 
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 32.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 20. 
 33.  Id.
 34.  See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 273 (2011). 
 35.  See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 55-58 (J. Coleman & S. Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 36.  See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 34 (finding corrective justice theory justifiable); Scott 
Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2011) 
(finding vengeance theory justifiable).  
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who say that once its true nature is recognized, its flaws are undeni-
able.37 One of the most powerful criticisms is a disjunctive one from 
Ripstein: it is that either civil recourse theory is vengeance-based, 
which is normatively unacceptable, or it is corrective justice based, 
which is acceptable but is not distinctive after all.38
 Perhaps the most troubling objection of all is one that comes from 
myself; it is most easily depicted as a variation of Ripstein’s disjunc-
tive objection.39 Either civil recourse theory’s normative foundation 
requires the embrace of a right to avenge wrongs, in which case it is 
underdeveloped and functionalist in a highly questionable manner, 
or civil recourse theory is rooted in a principle of corrective justice, in 
which case it is unacceptable under its own critique; there is no way 
to flesh out civil recourse theory without defeating ourselves. 
B.   Vengeance Theories 
 The question is why an individual is entitled to an avenue of civil 
recourse against someone who wronged him or her. One answer is 
that the victim of a wrong has a natural or prepolitical right to act 
aggressively against a wrongdoer and, because the state forecloses 
the exercise of this natural right, it incurs the obligation to provide a 
functional substitute. This is criticized by Finnis and others as the 
view that there is a right to revenge.40 It is true that, in my initial 
article introducing civil recourse theory, I articulated a social contract 
argument from Locke that asserted a natural right to punish wrong-
doers and a private right to compensation as a post-social contract 
substitute for the natural right.41 Even then, however, I was clear that 
the social contract and natural right language were merely the scaffold-
ing for a deeper set of principles, and John Goldberg and I have con-
sistently eschewed reliance on a natural right of revenge or retaliation.42
 A critical question is: If the state duty to supply an avenue of civil 
recourse is connected with the prohibition of noncivil aggression, how 
does that connection work? If noncivil aggression is put forward as a 
natural right in the sense of being a (moral) privilege that others 
must respect, one must offer an account of why a person is morally 
entitled to engage in noncivil aggression—violence—against one who 
wronged her or him. I did not and would not make that claim. I did, 
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 37.  See, e.g., Sam Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: 
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); Finnis, supra 
note 35 (arguing that vengeance theory is untenable and therefore civil recourse theory is un-
tenable). 
 38.  See Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 163, 186-88, 206-07 (2011). 
 39.  Id.
 40.  See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 35, at 57.   
 41.  See Zipursky, supra note 13, at 85-86. 
 42.  See, e.g., GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 18, at 62-69. 
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however, suggest that a victim of a wrong has a strong desire to re-
spond aggressively to having been wronged and that acting upon this 
desire would be of great subjective value to him or her.43 In construct-
ing a right to civil recourse out of this desire—let us call it a “desire 
to retaliate”—one might argue that the state may not cut off the op-
tion of acting upon this desire without supplying a good substitute; 
that it would not be treating citizens fairly if it did so. In addition to 
these contractualist arguments, there is, of course, a utilitarian and 
functionalist argument proceeding from the premise of a special in-
terest in retaliation which is being stymied; the claim is that: (1) 
some of the utility of serving that interest can be retained, without 
the utility loss from private violence; (2) there will be too much social 
unrest if there is no avenue of noncivil or civil recourse—that is, civil 
recourse generates a great peace-and-stability dividend, which is 
socially valuable. 
 It seems to me now that there are at least three general problems 
with all of these accounts. The first is that many unanswered empiri-
cal questions jump out: How pervasive is this desire? How valuable is 
it actually to act upon it? How successful is an avenue of civil re-
course as a substitute for a privilege of violent retaliation? A second 
is that there is a characteristic function or operation of a right of civil 
recourse, and it is in huge part to require the defendant to compen-
sate the plaintiff and to repair the injury he or she inflicted. Retalia-
tion is typically not constructive but destructive, and appears to have 
little to do with repair. A third is that—even apart from legal sys-
tems—a huge part of morality is learning to deal with having been 
wronged without acting upon vengeful desires. It is implausible to 
think of tort law as existing for those who lack the moral develop-
ment to do that without civil litigation. Thus, notwithstanding the 
elegant and thoughtful accounts of scholars like Oman,44 Her-
shovitz45, and Gold46 holding up (or at least sustaining serious scru-
tiny upon) the “retributive” or “revenge” or “getting even” side of civil 
recourse theory, and speaking here only for myself (not necessarily 
for Goldberg), the corrective justice theorists are right to suggest that 
I do not really wish to go down a “right to retaliate” route. 
C.   Corrective Justice Theories 
 The corrective justice critique asserts that the right to recourse 
turns on a correlative duty of the wrongdoer to provide compensation. 
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 43.  Zipursky, supra note 13. 
 44.  See generally Nathan B. Oman, Why There is No Duty to Pay Damages: Powers, Du-
ties, and Private Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (2011).  
 45.  See generally Hershovitz, supra note 36. 
 46.  See generally Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil Recourse, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
65 (2011).  
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The wrongdoer owes a duty of repair to the victim and that is why 
the victim has a right to be paid compensation by the wrongdoer. It 
is, in turn, because she has a right to be compensated by the wrong-
doer for her injury that she has a right of recourse against the 
wrongdoer. More generally, the argument goes, victims have a right 
of recourse against wrongdoers because wrongdoers owe duties of re-
pair to those whom they have wrongfully injured. As Ernest Weinrib 
has put it, civil recourse theory is not an alternative to corrective jus-
tice theory, it is a version of it.47
 As a critic of the view that tort law enforces duties of repair and 
more generally of corrective justice theory, I am not prepared to ac-
cept this critique. I have elsewhere set forth my reasons for rejecting 
corrective justice theory as an interpretive account of tort law, but it 
is worth reiterating the difficulties surrounding corrective justice 
theory and the substantive standing problem. Duties of repair, on my 
view (although not on the view of Ripstein or Weinrib),?track foresee-
able wrongful losses. While there is a great deal of overlap between 
the domain of people who have been wronged under the relevant tort 
and the domain of people who have foreseeable wrongful losses, the 
latter is both underinclusive and overinclusive relative to the former, 
and systematically so. There are plaintiffs who have no losses at all 
but have rights of action, and there are plaintiffs who have unfore-
seeable losses and have rights of action because they have substan-
tive standing. Conversely, there are many plaintiffs with foreseeable 
wrongful losses who have no right of action because substantive 
standing is lacking. So, among the many reasons I cannot accept the 
gracious peace offering of the corrective justice theorists is that I re-
gard it as leaving me without a solution to the substantive standing 
problem with which I began. 
 Ripstein and Weinrib both accept that there is a substantive 
standing rule in tort law, that is, that a plaintiff only has a right of 
action in tort against a defendant if the wrong done by the defendant 
was a wrong to the plaintiff.48 Indeed, as indicated above, my own 
work on substantive standing was heavily influenced by Weinrib’s 
work on Palsgraf and more generally on correlativity in The Idea of 
Private Law and in several important articles leading up to it.49 I do 
not (and could not) ascribe the proposition that the duty of repair 
tracks foreseeable wrongful loss to Weinrib or Ripstein; I attribute 
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 47.  Weinrib, supra note 34. 
 48. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114-44 (1995); see generally AR-
THUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999). 
 49.  See WEINRIB, supra note 48, at 114-44; Weinrib, supra note 34; Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 409-10 (1992). 
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roughly this proposition principally to Perry50 and Coleman.51 How-
ever, both Weinrib and Ripstein provide distinctive accounts of the 
duty of repair and its connection to the breach of the primary duty, 
accounts that are meant to accommodate the phenomenon of correla-
tivity and, in my terms, substantive standing.52
 The problem is that I do not believe the accounts they put forward 
hold up under scrutiny. While loss-based corrective justice theorists 
like Coleman and Perry offer an account that does link a duty of re-
pair to a primary duty, the account diverges from the pattern of rules 
and principles in tort law itself. Wrongs-based corrective justice theo-
rists, like Weinrib and Ripstein, retain the rules and principle of the 
tort law, but at the cost of their ability to explain why tort liability 
works as it does; in particular, they do not explain why the breach of 
a primary duty generates a duty of repair, as a general matter.  
 Weinrib believes that the breach of the primary cannot eliminate 
the duty; the duty must still be there even after the breach, and it is 
there in the different form of a duty of repair.53 I reject the proposi-
tion that a breach of the duty of care could not eliminate the duty; it 
is entirely possible that an action that breaches a duty of care could 
alter the world by so doing, and in that altered world the proposition 
that there is a duty not to do X is no longer true (it is either false or 
incoherent). Suppose, for example, X has a duty to Y not to break the 
single lilac-tinted chicken’s egg that Y entrusts him with at T1. If X 
breaches that duty at T2 (later than T1), there might well be some-
thing X could do at T3 to compensate Y for having breached this duty 
to Y, but it is not the case that, at T3, the proposition “X has a duty 
not to break the single lilac egg that Y entrusted him with” is true. It 
is perfectly coherent and possibly illuminating to say that the reason 
X must pay Y a certain amount at T3 is that X had a duty to Y not to 
break the egg at T2, which he breached at T2. Obviously, one wants 
more of an account of why the breach (at T2) of a duty to do A1 (keep 
the egg intact, refrain from breaking the egg) yields a duty at T3 to 
do A2 (pay Y). 
 John Gardner has intriguingly suggested that there is a “continui-
ty” between A1 and A2, and elaborated upon this point by asserting 
that the reasons for the duty to do A1 at T2 still exist at T3, and 
those same reasons generate a reason to do A2 at T3.54 Although I am 
skeptical about whether this argument will actually succeed in ex-
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 50.  See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 
(1992).  
 51.  See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992). 
 52.  Weinrib, supra note 34, at 276-78; Ripstein, supra note 38, at 197-98. 
 53.  See Weinrib, supra note 34, at 280-82.  
 54.  See generally John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective 
Justice, in Paper No. 1/2010 U. OF OXFORD LEG. RES. PAPER SERIES (January 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538342). 
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plaining why there are private rights of action against tortfeasors for 
compensation, it does escape the vulnerabilities of Weinrib’s conten-
tion that X’s duty to Y survives the X’s breach of that duty, as a gen-
eral matter. 
 Ripstein’s account, as I understand it, lies somewhere between 
Gardner’s and Weinrib’s (as I outlined it).55 It appears that he does 
not need to take a position on whether the primary duty survives the 
breach or whether the continuity thesis is more apt, because he for-
mulates his account in a manner that is, in the first instance, rights-
based rather than duty-based. Where the right in question is a sim-
ple example of a property right—for example, chattels, like a winter 
coat—both Weinrib’s and Gardner’s accounts work very nicely. If X 
breaches the duty correlative to Y’s right to the exclusive possession 
of the coat—e.g., X takes the coat—Y’s right to the exclusive posses-
sion of the coat survives that breach, and X’s duty correlative to that 
right also survives that breach. Likewise, there is an obvious continuity 
between X’s duty not to take the coat and X’s duty to return the coat 
(or, if X destroyed the coat, to pay Y compensation in the order of the 
value of the coat). In order to come down on Weinrib’s side or Gard-
ner’s side, Ripstein would have to choose a particular account of how 
one wants to individuate duties correlative to rights underlying tort 
law; for the most part, he has declined to make this choice. Interest-
ingly (and not coincidentally), Gardner (a Razian interest-theorist 
about rights) stands in a good position to embrace this combined ac-
count, by saying that a right exists insofar as there is an interest 
that provides a reason for the imposition of the primary obligation, 
and where it is that same interest that provides a reason for the 
imposition of the remedial obligation, there is in fact a right to repa-
ration; in this sense, there is a continuity of right.56 And I should add, 
in fairness to Weinrib, he certainly never takes duties to be more 
basic than rights and likely understands his own account as on all 
fours with Ripstein’s. Indeed, he has maintained in his article in 
this volume that the critique I have run, above, depends on an indi-
viduation of X’s duties of a sort that he himself has never offered, and 
actually rejects.57
 My central difficulty with Ripstein’s account does not pertain to 
whether it might in principle be adequate for a domain of private 
rights and duties, existing in and enforceable through private law. It 
might. The question is whether the body of law we know as the com-
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 55.  See generally Ripstein, supra note 38. The larger work into which Ripstein’s version of 
corrective justice theory fits is ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009); see also Arthur Ripstein, As if it Had Never Happened, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1957 (2007) [hereinafter Ripstein, Never Happened].
 56.  See Gardner, supra note 54, at 54-55. 
 57.  See Weinrib, supra note 34, at 280-81. 
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mon law of torts can be so understood. I claim it cannot. However 
nicely some domains of property torts might be accommodated by 
this account (and I certainly have my questions, even here), a very 
wide swath of negligence law and intentional tort law cannot be so 
understood. Ripstein’s whole account is in a certain sense dependent 
on rights that are in two important respects property-like: (a) the 
rights invasion can be fairly characterized as an interference with 
the plaintiff’s means (insofar as the rights invasion is in some way 
harm-dependent, the harm is a deprivation of the means to carry out 
purposes an actor has chosen or is entitled to choose; insofar as the 
rights invasion is not at all harm-dependent, it is intentional, and 
therefore involves the nonconsensual usage of the plaintiff’s means 
for the purposes of the defendant); (b) the remedy of compensatory 
damages through monetary payment can be fairly characterized as 
putting things back into a form that is “as if it had never happened.”58
 Chattels—like a piece of clothing or an automobile—arguably sat-
isfy these two conditions; whether real property or personal property 
with a sort of history or a set of irreproducible features qualify is a 
closer question, to put it gently. What I firmly reject is the contention 
that the many wrongs of tort law—most of which are not property 
torts—can be understood as the breaches of duties correlative of 
rights so conceived. Negligence or malpractice or battery culminating 
in irreparable physical injury—such as disfigurement or chronic 
pain—do not, in my view, meet either condition (a) or (b) above. Nor 
do a variety of other torts, both intentional and unintentional, that 
involve nonphysical and nonproprietary injuries. Libel, invasion of 
privacy, and assault are easy examples. Even if we conceded that all 
such nonphysical injury and nonproperty torts are intentional (which 
they are not), that is a far cry from saying that they involve use of a 
plaintiff’s means for a defendant’s purposes. The wronging in each of 
these cases is a doing, a negative mistreatment that is neither a dep-
rivation of stuff nor a purposive use of others’ stuff. 
 This is a big point, not a small one. It goes to the heart of the 
question of whether tort law in operation should really be understood 
as rectifying wrongs that are done in a sense that is nearly restitu-
tionary. To their credit, Weinrib and Ripstein (who maintain that it 
should) offer an account according to which raw interests are norma-
tively reprocessed through an equal and reciprocal normative frame-
work, so that they become rights; that is to say, while interests are in 
some sense at the core of rights, it is only cogent to talk about them 
within a more thoroughly normativized framework, one which views 
interests through the structure of rights (not vice versa).59 The prob-
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 58.  See generally Ripstein, Never Happened, supra note 55. 
 59.  Ripstein, supra note 38, at 171 (“[R]elational rights are not granted to protect inter-
ests taken to matter apart from them; interests are protected on the basis of rights.”). 
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lem is that tort law is about rights invasions and wrongs that do not 
abide by this theoretical framework. Tort law in operation does not in 
fact make the paraplegic or the libeled schoolteacher or the trauma-
tized person “as if it had never happened”; it does not do so in its 
normal operation and it does not indulge itself in the illusion that it 
is actually capable of doing so. The wrongs of tort—especially the 
ones that generate individual law suits—cut to the bone, and are not 
just about means.  
 While Weinrib might be correct that the wrongful act that consti-
tutes the tort is narrower than the duty correlative to the right, the 
duty cannot be stated so broadly that one has discharged it by paying 
compensatory damages. While the fact that the wrong has been done 
and the injury has been inflicted does not undercut the importance of 
a compensatory damages award, it is distorting the reality to suppose 
that a compensatory damages award is a discharge of the later ver-
sion of the duty that was breached. While it may be true to say that 
“one’s health is the most important thing one has,” it does not follow 
that one has one’s health in the sense that one has a car. Compensat-
ing someone for having wrongfully injured him is not the same as re-
turning to him the uninjured condition or its equivalent, because the 
state of being uninjured is not a piece of property or anything like it.60
D.   Summary 
 The larger question of this Article is not, however, about whether 
corrective justice theory is sound or about whether a right to retaliate 
view is tenable. It is about whether, assuming that one intends to 
reject both of those frameworks, there remains a normative basis for 
civil recourse theory. Put differently, the challenge of this Article is 
to set forth a justification for civil recourse theory that is not based in 
a right of revenge but is not simply a version of corrective theory ei-
ther. Unsurprisingly, the way between the rock and the hard place 
travels close to each, sometimes perilously so. 
V. SOLOMON, DARWALL, AND THE RECASTING                                              
OF CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY
 The impetus behind the account I shall develop is owed, in part, to 
the suggestion of Jason Solomon61 that civil recourse theory could 
benefit from recent work in moral theory by Stephen Darwall.62
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 60.  Cf. Hershovitz, supra note 36 (arguing that a tort damages remedy cannot return 
things to the way they were). 
 61.  See generally Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1765 (2009). 
 62.  STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2006). 
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Darwall, in turn, drew from Kant63 and Strawson64 (among others). 
Since Strawson’s understanding of reactive attitudes has long been a 
source of my thinking about responsibility and recourse, as well as a 
source of thinking of many tort theorists whom I have criticized (e.g., 
Perry and Honoré) Solomon’s helpful critique has, in a sense, brought 
us full circle. 
 Solomon rightly picks up the claims that Goldberg and I make 
that tort law is a way of holding responsible those who have commit-
ted a legal wrong against oneself.65 Goldberg and I have argued that 
the right to an avenue of civil recourse against a wrongdoer goes 
hand in hand with the idea that one is entitled to have a wrongdoer 
held responsible to oneself for having wronged one.66 And we have—
sometimes more informally than others—relied upon two different 
kinds of ideas in doing so: one lying within moral psychology and 
normative theory and one lying within political morality. The moral 
psychological idea is that the victim of a wrongdoing typically or fre-
quently has a subjective feeling of being aggrieved and a subjective 
desire to respond to having been wronged by acting in some manner, 
self-restoratively and self-preservatively against the wrongdoer.67 At 
least some component of such reactive attitudes is, in certain circum-
stances, not only natural, but legitimate, morally appropriate, and 
warranted.  The political morality idea is that a polis that maintains 
a monopoly on the use of coercive force in so doing restricts in various 
ways the inclinations of persons—including aggrieved persons—to 
actualize their attitudes in response to having been wronged. In so 
restricting the exercise of such desires and wishes, the state incurs 
an obligation to do so in a manner that recognizes their legitimacy, 
and to do so in a manner that preserves the equality of victim and 
wrongdoer and preserves the equality among victims.68
 Drawing upon these ideas (although not always as such), Solomon 
adds a deep-cutting idea from Darwall in the pure theory of morali-
ty.69 According to Solomon, the pure theory of morality idea is a sub-
set of normative reasons which have a fundamentally second-
personal structure: an actor’s reason to act in a particular manner 
essentially depends on the legitimacy of a demand of another ad-
dressed to him or her: you must do A (or you must not do A) (where A 
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 63.  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor, ed., 
trans, 1998). 
 64.  P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-25 (1974). 
 65.  Solomon, supra note 61, at 1801-02. (citing John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 368 (2005)).  
 66.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 65, at 368; Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as 
Wrongs, supra note 18, at 974. 
 67.  See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 13, at 83-85.  
 68.  See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 18, at 974. 
 69.  Solomon, supra note 61, at 1791-97. 
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is a way of treating or mistreating the other, demanding person).70
Darwall believes that the very idea of moral obligation is second-
personal in this way.71
 Solomon nicely adapts Darwall’s general point to the normativity 
of private rights of action.72 He adopts the moral psychology idea, and 
adds a fairly strong normative statement to the effect that an indi-
vidual is entitled to express the negative reactive attitude in action in 
some form.73 He elaborates the point of political morality so that it 
becomes clear that the state is obligated to provide some means 
whereby an individual can do this.74 Then he depicts a tort claim as, 
essentially, a second personal demand by the victim against the tort-
feasor.75 The provision of a right of action therefore fulfills the state 
duty to treat this legitimate need of victims equally: each is entitled 
to bring a claim against the wrongdoer. 
 Solomon’s account solves some of the problems that beset a venge-
ance-based justification of civil recourse theory. There is no depend-
ency on social contract theory in any particularly objectionable or na-
ïve form, because he is willing to assert the justifiability of the re-
sentment of the victim and of the victim’s entitlement to express and 
act upon that resentment in some form. Moreover, the state’s obliga-
tion to empower individuals is a combination of an individual duty, in 
light of the legitimacy of the victim’s response and desire, and an ob-
ligation said to be inherent in treating citizens equally. Perhaps most 
importantly, what a tort cause of action provides is not an opportuni-
ty to hurt the wrongdoer or act against the wrongdoer as such, but 
rather a right to demand that the wrongdoer be held accountable. 
Hence, the most troubling aspect of the non-corrective-justice version 
of civil recourse theory is eliminated. One is not, at any level, credit-
ing the legitimacy of acting violently against the tortfeasor. It is not 
as if bringing a tort claim is a civil smack at the defendant; it is a civ-
il demand for accountability. 
 There are, however, at least two serious problems with Solomon’s 
account. First, the Strawsonian point as an observation that such 
reactive attitudes do occur is of course not nearly enough; we need an 
account of why an individual is entitled to feel resentful toward the 
wrongdoer, an account of why an individual is in some sense entitled 
to act aggressively upon such resentment, and why such aggressive 
action is connected with the sorts of remedies supplied for private 
rights of action. Strawson himself was famously trying to connect re-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 70.  Id. at 1794-97. 
 71.  DARWALL, supra note 62, at 91-118. 
 72.  Solomon, supra note 61, at 1794-97. 
 73.  Id.
 74.  Id. at 1798-1811. 
 75.  Id. at 1808. 
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active attitudes to the notion of responsibility, in order to finesse a 
set of conceptual problems in the theory of free will and responsibil-
ity; he was not trying to explain the legitimacy of the reactive atti-
tudes themselves.76
 The second point relates more to Darwall than to Solomon, but is 
applicable to the latter because of his dependency upon the former. 
One of Darwall’s key claims is that standing to demand performance 
by the other is essential to the notion of an obligation of the other.77
Moreover, for Darwall, these essentially interconnected concepts lead 
us to the claim that part of what it is for D to have a duty not to mis-
treat P is for P to be entitled to hold D accountable for having mis-
treated her. A principle of standing for obligees, for Darwall, is built 
into the notion of D’s having duties to others at all. 
 The problem that arises, for civil recourse theory, is that a condi-
tion for the adequacy of the theory since the very beginning has been 
its capacity to provide a noncircular explanation of the substantive 
standing rule. For someone endeavoring, like Darwall, to structure 
an integrative theory of moral concepts, the circularity is not neces-
sarily vicious. But given that a desideratum of the acceptability of a 
solution to the legal problems with which I started was the capacity 
to generate a nonvacuous explanation, the circularity is vicious here. 
 Darwall’s very rich book merits greater attention as a theory of 
morality than I can give it here, but that is no reason to turn it aside 
as a resource for understanding tort law. Like Solomon—and in sub-
stantial part because of Solomon—I find Darwall’s second-person 
demands based understanding of obligations highly suggestive for 
tort theory. With both the problems of Solomon’s account and the fer-
tility of Darwall’s conceptual apparatus in mind, I embark on the 
construction of a different sort of defense for civil recourse theory. 
 The account that follows is indirect, traveling first through some 
theorizing about positive morality. The ideas elucidated in that con-
text will permit a more focused approach to the account of rights of 
action and civil recourse in tort law. 
VI.   ACCOUNTABILITY, RELATIONAL DUTIES, AND STANDING IN          
POSITIVE MORALITY
A.   Accountability in Positive Morality 
 Consider the following utterances: 
1. “You were found to have plagiarized your English essay. This 
is not the first time. You are expelled.” (teacher to student) 
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 76.  See generally STRAWSON, supra note 64. 
 77.  DARWALL, supra note 62, at 99. 
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2. “I told you to clean your room. You were not supposed to be 
watching TV. You are grounded.” (parent to child) 
3. “You actually missed the 9:00 deposition? You are fired!” (em-
ployer to employee) 
4. “You cheated on your wife? You must tell her before someone 
else does. You must apologize. You must make amends to her. 
You must pray for forgiveness. You must never do it again.” 
(clergyperson to congregant) 
5. “You went into Iraq and told the world there were WMD’s. That 
was false. You must admit that it was false, explain how this 
happened, and try to get us out.” (citizenry to political leader) 
6. “That was my favorite set of DVDs. They really are gone? You 
just left them on the train, when I loaned them to you? I want 
new ones. They weren’t cheap and they weren’t easy to find. I 
will find them again, but you must buy them.” (friend to friend) 
 All of these statements are typical of utterances said in conjunc-
tion with holding someone responsible for having done something 
that he or she should not have done, and, more precisely, said as part 
and parcel of the act of holding someone accountable for having done 
something wrong. In each case, there is at least an implicit reference 
to a norm of conduct applicable to the actor being criticized. The 
speaker is asserting that the actor violated an institutional norm of 
conduct, a norm of filial obedience, a norm of employment, a norm of 
fidelity, a norm of candor and truthfulness and competence, and a 
norm of care for others’ belongings. 
 Additionally, in each case there is someone purporting to occupy a 
position in which she is entitled to issue a criticism or complaint, and 
to mete out some consequences or sanctions or to make a demand. In 
the first, it is a norm of the school and a school official is holding the 
wrongdoer accountable. The second is a parent occupying a position 
of authority over his or her child. The third is an employer, the fourth 
a clergyperson, the fifth a citizen, and the sixth a friend. 
 For each of the prior examples, one could assess the accountability 
along various dimensions: (1) Is it a moral, legal, social, contractual, 
institutional, religious, political norm, or some combination of these, 
or a distinctive kind of norm? (2) Is the wrong that was performed a 
wrong to some person or class of persons? (3) What, if any, is the re-
lation between the norm violated and the complainant? Is the com-
plainant a victim of the wrong, an intended beneficiary, in a contrac-
tual relation, the issuer of the norm, or someone charged with the 
role of complainant? (4) Is the respondent acting with authority to 
impose some form of response, is the respondent making a demand, 
or is the respondent acting in some other capacity? (5) Is the response 
a punishment, an imposition of financial responsibility, a declaration 
of status, an official act, or something else? 
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B.   The Distinction Between Relational and Non-Relational Duties 
 As indicated in Part I,78 it is possible to distinguish between two 
kinds of duties based on a distinction between two kinds of directives 
of conduct. In my prior work, I distinguished between simple directives 
and relational directives.79 A relational directive is one that enjoins 
members of a certain group from acting a certain way upon members 
of another group. “No one is to hit anyone.” “For all X, if X has a 
longstanding romantic relationship with Y(X), then X shall not reveal 
intimate facts of Y(X)’s life to others.” A simple directive sets forth act 
types that the domain of persons enjoined are not to commit (or are to 
commit). “No one shall litter.” “No one shall stage a false emergency.” 
 Where there are relational directives, the directive imposes duties 
upon the domain of persons whom it enjoins not to mistreat the per-
sons in the range specified by the directive. These duties, because 
each is a duty not to act upon some person in the manner specified by 
the directive, are aptly called “relational duties.” By the same token, 
duties imposed by simple directives are called simple duties. Note 
that relational directives also impose simple duties: the duty not to 
perform any killing. 
 Similarly, many breaches of relational directives are relational 
wrongs (they are wrongs to plaintiffs), and many breaches of simple 
directives are simple wrongs (they are not wrongs to anyone). Some 
simple wrongs are also breaches of relational directives. 
 Finally, where there are relational wrongs there are rights of po-
tential victims not to be mistreated. That is because where there are 
relational wrongs, there are relational directives, and where there 
are relational directives there are relational duties. Relational duties 
are to someone; the one to whom a relational duty is breached has a 
right not to be mistreated in the manner enjoined by the directive. 
Rights against mistreatment are correlative to duties not to mistreat. 
C.   Accountability to Victims for Relational Wrongs 
 Recall that example six above involved a victim of a wrong holding 
the wrongdoer accountable to him. There are many similar examples:  
 7.  “You spilled my gin and tonic! At least make me a new one!” 
(The addressee clumsily knocked into the speaker and knocked 
over his gin and tonic.) 
 8.   “You stole from me. Give it back!” (The addressee took a coveted, 
signed baseball from the speaker, which the speaker discov-
ered on visiting the addressee’s apartment). 
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 78.  See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
 79.  Zipursky, supra note 13, at 59-60. 
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 9.  “You cheated on me. Move out!” (The speaker is a romantic, 
live-in partner of the addressee, who had an affair with anoth-
er woman.) 
 10. “You showed my diary to your friends? Why? How could you do 
that to me?” [An implicit demand to explain herself, to apologize, 
and to make it right] (The speaker and addressee are sisters.) 
 In each of these cases, a relational directive was violated, a rela-
tional duty was breached, and a relational wrong was performed. In 
each case, the victim under the relational norm had a right not to be 
treated in this way, and in each case, the right was violated. The 
speaker in each case is demanding some responsive conduct of the 
addressee, in light of the addressee’s having wronged her. Making 
the demand of responsive conduct is an act done in the process of try-
ing to hold the wrongdoer accountable for having wronged her. 
 These examples are quite familiar; it does not seem a stretch to 
suppose that people frequently say things to one another under such 
circumstances. The interesting normative claim is that people are 
entitled to say such things and that people are entitled to make 
demands that will serve as reasons (not necessarily conclusive) for 
the addressee to respond accordingly. In other words, it seems 
plausible to suggest that the lover who was cheated is entitled to 
demand that her lover move out and to have him act accordingly, 
that the injured speaker in one is entitled to demand an apology and 
thereby to receive one, and so on. And it is because one who was 
wronged by another is entitled to demand responsive conduct of a sort 
from the wrongdoer. This point can be restated in an illuminating 
and provocative manner: One who was wronged by another is entitled 
to have the wrongdoer perform certain responsive acts toward her if 
she so demands.
 I want to soften this point in a significant way and, for the mo-
ment, turn it into a sociological claim about our norms of positive mo-
rality rather than a first order normative claim: Under widely accept-
ed social norms governing interpersonal relationships, one who was 
wronged by another is entitled to demand responsive conduct of a sort 
from the wrongdoer and have such demands complied with. Let us 
suppose, for the purposes of argument, that this sociological assertion 
is true, that there are, in fact, such widely acceptable social norms, 
and let us call such norms “demand-accountability norms of positive 
morality.” Would such demand-accountability norms be justifiable, 
and if so, why?
 At least five different sorts of considerations contribute to the jus-
tifiability of a set of norms of positive morality according to which 
there is such an entitlement, and a correlative vulnerability to de-
mands of others. For convenience, I shall give labels to each of these 
five: (1) self-respect, self-protection, and respectworthiness; (2) agen-
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cy recognition; (3) the duty/responsibility linkage; (4) reconciliation of 
wrongdoer and victim; and (5) schemes of rights and goods. 
 (i)   Self-Respect, Self-Protection, and Respectworthiness 
 First, and most importantly, is a point made by Darwall, Straw-
son, and Jeffrie Murphy in Forgiveness and Mercy80: Those who are 
wronged often resent the wrongdoer, and such resentment is often 
entirely appropriate and justifiable.81 If this is correct, then it has 
implications for the evaluation of those who demand responsive con-
duct. It is entirely implausible that resentment should simply sim-
mer inside the person who is wronged. If feeling resentment is an 
aspect of normal healthy functioning, then expressing it and acting 
upon it in some form or other is bound to be morally appropriate, at 
least in the right time and place.  
 That is for two reasons. First, as Nietzsche and now more than a 
century of psychology have pointed out, unexpressed rage has a vari-
ety of negative effects on the individual and on society.82 More im-
portantly, however, the reasons behind Murphy’s comments apply a
fortiori to the appropriateness of acting in some manner towards the 
wrongdoer if one has been wronged. Just as one is entitled to resent 
the wrongdoer for having wronged oneself, so one is entitled to act 
self-preservatively, defensively, and self-restoratively in response to 
having been mistreated. Although this does not entail the right to act 
violently or inflict physical harm, it does typically entail the right to 
demand ameliorative responsive conduct. The idea is, in part, that 
one need not take the blows delivered by others lying down. Just as 
the proclivity to a significant degree of self-defense is healthy, nor-
mal, and perhaps even laudable (insofar as it enhances survival and 
self-esteem), so the proclivity to self-restorativeness, self-esteem, and 
control is (in suitably qualified ways) a virtue, an excellence, and a 
strength. Standing up for oneself is integral to maintaining one’s 
dignity. There is a world of difference between a person who demands 
a duel on the occasion of a slight and the person who demands an 
apology for a slander. The former is a dangerous excess of operatic 
proportions; the latter, a quotidian and normal sign of self-respect. 
 The moral entitlement to make a demand of one’s injurer for re-
sponsive conduct is closely connected with the idea that one’s for-
giveness of another’s wrongs to oneself may, and often should, be 
conditioned in various ways upon the wrongdoer’s ameliorative con-
duct (an apology is an example of responsive conduct). Too easily for-
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 80.  JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (2006). 
 81.  See id. at 16. 
 82.  Id. at 104 (citing Nietzsche’s account of psychological dangers to the angry individual 
of unexpressed hatred); id. at 92 n.5 (referring to “social and personal dangers latent in [vic-
tims’] powerful feelings [of hatred]”). 
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giving someone—too easily foreswearing resentment of one who has 
wronged one—is sometimes a sign of lack of self-respect. 
 (ii)   Agency Recognition 
 Second, is a line of thought from Honoré to Perry, and Gardner. 
Part of recognizing the domain of what one as done as a person is 
recognizing the domain of actions, actions conceived in such a way as 
to sweep in the injuries one has done to others.83 Part of owning one-
self and one’s achievements in the world is understanding oneself as 
subject to the responses of others to what one has done.84 This is lit-
erally what responsibility and accountability are about. Accountabil-
ity for breaches of duty and wrongs is not limited to accountability for 
relational wrongs. The breaking of rules and standards and the 
breaching of nonrelational duties will lead to consequences from au-
thorities with standing to enforce nonrelational directives. Similarly, 
the breach of relational duties generates vulnerability to the demand 
of victims for responsive conduct. Understanding our actions as ac-
tions to others—injurings, wrongs, savings, lovings—that reach out 
to others goes hand-in-hand with understanding oneself as answera-
ble to others postwronging demands, just as it involves understand-
ing oneself as properly subject to the gratitude of others after one has 
benefitted them, under certain circumstances. 
 (iii)   The Duty/Responsibility Linkage 
 Third, there is a conceptual cross-fertilization between the domain 
of accountability and the domain of duties. Our understanding of 
where our relational moral duties lie, and to whom, tends to intersect 
with our understanding of who will be able to hold us accountable 
and for which injuries. If we understand the term “obligation” to en-
tail an obligee who will have standing to hold someone accountable 
for performing a duty and also for breaching it, and we in fact hold 
the principle that victims of relational wrongs have standing to de-
mand responsive conduct, then it will turn out that moral relational 
duties are also moral relational obligations. Both the identification 
and the enforcement of relational directives are facilitated by a social 
understanding according to which wronging generates standing to 
hold the wrongdoer accountable. While that is in some ways a func-
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tionalist analysis, it is not a reductive or purely instrumentalist one, 
for the meaning and significance of obligations is not merely their 
connection with vulnerability to demands of obligees. The point is 
that it is part of what it is, for us (given how we conceive of duties), 
that relational duties are accompanied by obligations and standing to 
demand responsive conduct. It therefore appears to be part of what 
makes it the case that there can be a set of social mores that include 
relational directives, and that guide. 
 (iv)   Reconciliation of Wrongdoer and Victims 
 Fourth, the possibility of harmonious intercourse in society de-
pends in part on practices of reconciliation. A transaction of post-
wronging demand and compliance is evidently part and parcel of a 
set of reconciliation practices, which no doubt have instrumental val-
ue, both in permitting interaction to go forward and in forestalling 
conflict. Moreover, a variety of kinds of relationships in society de-
pend upon a background in which it is understood that this sort of 
accountability for wrongs exists among persons. 
 (v)   Schemes of Rights and Goods 
 Finally, some of the relational duties of morality and the corre-
sponding rights are connected with individual goods, and these du-
ties and rights play a role in defining and protecting these goods. 
Rights in personal property and rights to bodily integrity are prime 
examples. The right to demand return of property that was taken or 
repair of property that was broken plays a substantial role in consti-
tuting what it is for there to be personal property in which an indi-
vidual has a property right. More straightforwardly, the right to as-
sistance from the wrongdoer in helping to recover from a physical 
injury inflicted helps to protect that interest prospectively and after 
the fact too; the compensation obtained through demands has at least 
instrumental value. Although I have here defended the moral right to 
demand responsive conduct on principally noninstrumental grounds, 
there is no reason to deny that a set of social practices that involved 
recognition of such rights would also enjoy a set of benefits for both 
constitutive and instrumental reasons. 
E.   The Distinction Between the Normative Basis for                       
Relational Duties and the Normative Basis for a Right to                
Demand Responsive Conduct 
 Whether or not one accepts that there are such norms in our posi-
tive morality (whether there is such a thing as “our positive morali-
ty”, and whether or not such norms would actually be justifiable, all 
told), a conceptual point about these norms, so conceived, should now 
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be emerging. The set of values that would undergird a moral right to 
demand responsive conduct to a breach of some relational duty is not 
identical to the set of values that would underlie the justifiability of 
the relational directive giving rise to that duty. The reasons underly-
ing a norm requiring that one keep the intimate confidences of a 
friend are not identical with the reasons underlying a norm according 
to which one would be entitled to hold a friend accountable for a hurt-
ful disclosure of such confidences, for example. The former set of rea-
sons pertains to both the values of trust in a friendship and the im-
portance to individuals of delimiting others’ awareness of private 
facts of one’s life. The latter indirectly involves such values, but in 
the first instance pertains to allowing individuals to act self-
preservatively to maintain respect and dignity for themselves, to al-
lowing others to understand the significance of their hurtful actions 
to others and take ownership of them, and to fostering reconciliation. 
 The larger point is that even if one accepts, as I do, that a person’s 
right to demand responsive conduct for an injuring is connected to 
whether that injuring was a breach of duty to him or her, one need 
not and should not accept that the connection is purely analytic. The 
notion of being accountable to another for one’s breach of duty to that 
other is not built into the notion of a breach of duty to the other. It is 
a substantive, not an analytic connection. If there is a right of re-
sponsive conduct, it does not flow from the very idea of a right not to 
be mistreated. The relational directive itself, and the values underly-
ing it, generate the right not to be mistreated (if there is one). The 
right to hold the wrongdoer to account (if there is one) is based on a 
set of values that justify a set of demand-making and demand-
accommodating practices. To be sure, it is part of the justification of 
those practices that they are supportive of the entrenchment and ef-
ficacy of the directives, but that is only a part of the justification of 
such practices. 
 The point is both subtler and more striking when one steps back 
and takes a broader look at rights not to be mistreated and rights to 
demand responsive conduct from those by whom one has been treat-
ed. It is instructive to ask, with respect to each, how different attrib-
utes of a putative right holder might bear on whether the person is 
genuinely a right holder, and how norms of equality might affect the 
answer to these questions. 
 An example will make the point clearer. Consider the question of 
whether a given being—let us say a five-year old child—should be 
counted as among the range of persons to whom various relational 
duties of conduct apply: Are norms of privacy applicable to her? Is 
vigilance for her bodily integrity and physical health required? Part 
of answering that question involves looking at her needs and the 
conditions for her well-being. Surely, at least some norms of privacy 
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are applicable to her, and vigilance for her bodily integrity and 
physical health is required. Part of treating a child as an equal is 
taking seriously her needs and well-being and including her in this 
range of persons. Does the child have standing to demand responsive 
conduct, to hold others accountable for their breaches of relational 
duty? This is clearly not the same question. If we do regard her as 
having standing to hold others accountable, we are treating her as an 
independent locus of authority in certain ways, and in doing so, we 
are extending an equality norm to her. The ideals of equality and 
equal, mutual accountability—ideals beautifully set forth by Darwall 
in The Second Person Standpoint—are not necessarily a unified set 
of ideals.85 It would be conceptually cogent to recognize moral di-
rectives that required she not be mistreated in various ways and yet 
not to treat here as having standing to hold others responsible for 
such mistreatments. 
 Two observations, now: one about substantive standing and rela-
tional duties, and one about Darwall. As to substantive standing and 
relational duties, it is that the enterprise in tort theory of elucidating 
substantive standing doctrine required developing an analytical ac-
count of relational duties according to which the potentiality for legal 
recovery was not built into the notion of a wrong. The very same ana-
lytical framework now permits us to give much greater depth to the 
notion of accountability to others for moral wrongs. 
 As to Darwall, the analysis suggests a challenge. At numerous 
points in his book, Darwall suggests that the notion of a moral wrong 
and the notion of accountability for wrongs are essentially linked.86 A 
passage in the chapter on “Moral Obligation and Accountability” is 
representative. Referring to demands of the sort we have been dis-
cussing above as “forms of second-personal address” and the account-
ability of wrongdoers under such demands as “second-personal account-
ability,” Darwall refers to “moral obligation’s essential tie to second-
personal-accountability” and states that “[t]he very ideas of wrong 
and moral obligation, therefore, are intrinsically related to the forms 
of second-personal address that . . . constitute moral accountability.”87
 The analysis of relational duties and relational wrongs suggests 
that Darwall’s claims are, at a minimum, overstated. While the spe-
cial forms of accountability to someone that exist for breaches of 
moral duties may indeed be tied to the structure of relational wrongs, 
the idea of a duty owed to another does not entail second personal-
accountability. Such accountability may be inferred where a set of 
substantive norms and values about the rights to demand responsive 
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conduct are embraced, and it may be that such norms and values are 
fully justified. Moreover, it may be that we will understand these re-
lational directives and the duties they impose quite differently if we 
also embrace these norms of relational accountability. But this falls 
far short of an essential connection. Moreover, the assertion that 
there is an essential connection risks obscuring the distinctive sub-
stantive values underlying both the relational duties and the norms 
of accountability. 
F.   The Distinction Between a Demand-Dependent Responsive Duty 
and a Demand-Independent Responsive Duty 
 The right to demand responsive conduct of the wrongdoer is, in 
the respects laid out above, victim-centered; it is rooted in the legiti-
macy and value of certain self-defensive and self-preservative attrib-
utes, reactions, and attitudes to having been wronged. This aspect of 
the right to demand responsive conduct is nicely illustrated by exam-
ple nine, above: “You cheated on me. Move out!” spoken by someone 
to her lover and apartment-mate. For the sake of simplicity, let us 
suppose that the statement is uttered by a woman who learned that 
her lover/boyfriend had a weekend romance with another woman, 
that the woman speaking and her boyfriend had rented an apartment 
together, and that the material hardship of his moving out is not ex-
traordinary or irreparable (because of nearby friends or family). 
 Let us suppose that it is justifiable for her to make this demand in 
response to his having cheated on her and that he ought to move out 
if she so demands under these circumstances. It would hardly follow 
from these statements that the boyfriend would have a duty to move 
out even if she did not so demand. Nor would it follow that he has a 
duty to offer to move out, if she does not so demand. Her right to 
have him perform certain acts because of what he did to her is in part 
her right to initiate a demand that he perform these acts. She invol-
untarily stood as a victim of his wrong—the betrayal of trust. Having 
endured this wronging, and the injury (fractured trust and wounded 
feelings), she is now in a position to complain of having been so 
wronged and to demand ameliorative conduct of him. Likewise, hav-
ing so wronged her, he is vulnerable to her demands for responsive 
conduct. Her right to have him perform certain acts because of what 
he did to her is in part her right to initiate a demand that he perform 
these acts. 
 The more general point is that the fact of having been wronged by 
another generates not only a basis for complaining of having been 
wronged by the other, but also a basis for a demand for ameliorative 
conduct by the wrongdoer. This might be called a patient-relative 
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right. There is a history of a wrong and the history of the wrong gives 
rise to a prerogative in the victim. 
 As I have suggested in prior work, the prerogative to demand re-
sponsive conduct is the mirror image of self-defense, conceptually.88 It 
is the reasonably anticipated future of conduct from the wrongdoer to 
the victim that generates a right in the victim to act against the 
wrongdoer, in self-defense. Conversely, it is the history of conduct by 
the wrongdoer against the victim that generates a right to demand 
responsive and ameliorative conduct. In self-defense, it is because the 
future action is deemed unavoidable without the victim forcing her-
self upon the expected wrongdoer that victim is allowed to force her-
self onto the expected wrongdoer. The expected wrongdoer is re-
quired, morally, to be the object of the victim’s preemptive act. In re-
sponse to a wrongdoing that was done, the actual wrongdoer is re-
quired to be subject to the victim’s control, to her demand for amelio-
rative conduct. In both cases, our moral understanding of individuals 
is that they are entitled to be self-protective, and being self-protective 
often means responding to wrongs upon oneself by asserting control 
over the wrongdoer. In both cases, an individual’s right to be treated 
as autonomous and to be protected from the intrusions and demands 
of others is qualified by the privilege of others to be self-protective 
both before and after having been wronged. 
 It is easy to misconstrue the right to demand responsive conduct 
for at least three reasons. The first is that—to put the point ironical-
ly—there are morally commendable and morally criticizable ways for 
a wrongdoer to follow-up his wrongdoing, and it is often commenda-
ble (and sometimes obligatory) to offer one’s responsive conduct or 
perform such conduct prior to (and without) being asked to do so or 
having such conduct demanded. If I spill my friend’s gin and tonic or 
stain his rug with marinara sauce, I should probably get him a new 
drink or pay to have his rug cleaned, or at least offer to do so. I 
should not wait until asked or demanded. In a casual case like a 
spilled drink, one might not actually describe the spiller as having a 
duty to get a new drink, but that is perhaps because the language of 
“duty” is typically a cue that more serious interests are at stake. In 
any event, it is at least commendable and a sign of good character to 
do so, and it may well be that there is a duty to do so. 
 Such examples sometimes even tend to prove the opposite of what 
might seem to be shown. A large part of why one might regard it as 
commendable, in this example, to pay for carpet cleaning without 
asking or to go and get another drink and clean up the mess, is that 
it would be better if one’s friend (or host) did not have to make such a 
demand. One recognizes that such a demand would be legitimate, 
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and spares the injured person the insecurity and discomfort of mak-
ing it, in some of these cases. The right to make the demand does not 
derive from the duty to perform the act. Rather, the duty to perform 
the act—if there is one—comes from the legitimacy of the demand 
and the virtue of performing the ameliorative conduct without requir-
ing a demand. 
 A second reason for misconceiving the nature of the right to de-
mand responsive conduct relates to a broad domain of wrongs—
property wrongs. Imagine that Jane picks up a laptop from the large 
table in the college library where she is sitting, places it in her knap-
sack, and then reopens it at Starbucks a couple of hours later, where 
she realizes that it is not her laptop, but another sophomore’s (say, 
Wayne’s). Wayne happens to be sitting at the same Starbucks, hav-
ing been upset for the past couple of hours that his laptop was (he 
thought) stolen. If Wayne demands that Jane return his laptop, she 
will have at least a prima facie duty to do so. But Jane has a duty to 
do so even prior to Wayne’s demand; more importantly, Wayne’s de-
mand does not trigger Jane’s duty. Her duty comes from the fact that 
Wayne owns the laptop that she took. One of the many valuable fac-
ets of the institutions of property law is that the rights laid down as a 
bundle are structured such that we understood property rights to en-
tail a variety of duties in others, both negative duties and, under cer-
tain circumstances, affirmative duties. One way of understanding the 
difference between Ripstein’s views and mine is that Ripstein be-
lieves the conceptual structure of the Kantian account of private 
rights is broad enough and flexible enough to cover all of tort law89
(as well as other areas of private law), whereas I see it as an untena-
ble stretch beyond the law of property (and, perhaps, property torts). 
A third reason is that many wrongs are ongoing or continuous, and 
the demand that a victim would make is a demand to discontinue the 
wrongful conduct against him. In this case, there is a duty to comply 
with the demand that preexists the demand itself, because the duty 
is just the primary duty of conduct. Interestingly, a central example 
of Darwall’s is of this form; the injurer is stepping on the victim’s foot 
and the victim demands that the injurer remove his foot.90 This is an 
ongoing battery and the demand for responsive conduct is really a 
demand to discontinue the battery. 
 It might seem that, in the past few paragraphs I “hath protest[ed] 
too much,”?that the power of the duty-of-repair intuition is evidently 
great and displays the superior normative strength of corrective jus-
tice theory, and that these prior three explanations are examples of 
efforts to explain away the duty of repair rather than to explain the 
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moral ideas underlying tort law (an argument I have made, following 
Weinrib and Coleman, against economic accounts of tort law). It is 
important to see why such an ad hominem objection would not be 
well taken. 
 Our ultimate problem is to explain the structure of the law of 
torts, and I have since the beginning of my work on civil recourse 
theory offered sustained arguments that civil recourse theory better 
captures the actual structure of tort law than corrective justice theo-
ry. Whether sound or unsound, those arguments are not what is at 
issue here. What is at issue is a question that is deeper, narrower, 
and distinct: the question is whether the assertion that a person has 
a right to demand ameliorative conduct of someone by whom he is 
wronged can stand on its own, independent of the claim that the 
wrongdoer has a prior duty to supply such ameliorative conduct. I 
have argued—even prior to the subsequent explanations—that such 
an assertion is cogent and plausible.91 I have not denied that there 
often are moral duties of repair because of which there is a right to 
demand ameliorative conduct, both in the proprietary and the 
nonproprietary context. The point is that the easy assumption that, 
in morality, the right to demand ameliorative conduct from a wrong-
doer flows from a preexisting duty of repair need not be true in order 
for there to be a right to demand repair. Relatedly, the existence of a 
right to demand ameliorative conduct does not entail the existence of 
a duty to supply ameliorative conduct absent such a demand. 
 Once one sees the possibility of a right to demand ameliorative 
conduct, it is easily observed in a wide range of domains in ordinary 
life. A person who inadvertently makes a nasty comment or insinua-
tion about her friend or family member will sometimes be confronted 
with a demand that she explain herself. “What did you mean by 
that?” If not so confronted, the nasty friend may (and probably 
should!) diverge from her path of nasty commentary to safer com-
mentary . . . and change the subject. It may well be, however, that 
the demand is something she ought to comply with, once issued. 
 On a completely different front, imagine an impoverished African 
country that receives substantial monetary assistance from the Unit-
ed States on a regular basis. Add to this that members of the military 
forces of this nation, on an escapade that goes beyond what they are 
directed or permitted by their superiors to do, torture three American 
soldiers. In response the United States demands that the country re-
turn the very recent $10 million installment of a loan program. 
Whether the U.S. would be morally entitled to demand the return of 
the money is not the same as the question of whether this country 
should return the money absent such a demand. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 91.  Zipursky, supra note 13, at 55-70. 
336 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:299 
VII. RETURNING TO LAW: CIVIL RECOURSE AND THE RIGHT TO           
DEMAND RESPONSIVE CONDUCT
 Let us now return to tort law and tort theory. A person who has 
been wronged is morally entitled to demand responsive conduct of 
her wrongdoer. She is morally entitled not only to articulate particu-
larized injunctions for responsive conduct, but to articulate them in a 
way which is such that her doing so—in conjunction with the fact 
that the wrongdoer did wrong her, in the way that he did—counts as 
a reason for the wrongdoer to supply the beneficent conduct. The 
entitlement to utter the demand, which entitlement is engendered by 
the commission of the relational wrong to her, is of course not simply 
an entitlement to speak certain words, but an entitlement to have 
another person act in accordance with one’s having spoken those 
words, or at least to act in a manner that reflects the demand’s being a 
ground for regarding such a responsive performance as mandatory. 
That is because having been wronged generates both a grievance (in 
the victim) and a normative vulnerability in the wrongdoer; the 
wrongdoer is vulnerable to the legitimate demand for responsive 
conduct by the aggrieved victim. As to the responsive conduct, there 
is a moral liability or vulnerability to perform it or some facsimile 
thereof, if demanded, but the conduct demanded is not necessarily 
conduct that, absent such a demand there would be a duty to per-
form. In all of these respects, there is a right in the victim to demand 
responsive conduct of the wrongdoer. To be more precise, there is a 
prima facie moral right in the victim of the relational wrong to de-
mand responsive conduct. 
 We are now in a better position to offer a normative account for 
the Right of Action Principle in tort law. A victim of a relational legal 
wrong is entitled to demand that the wrongdoer engage in certain 
responsive conduct toward her, just as a victim of a relational moral 
wrong is entitled to demand responsive conduct. The presence of 
courts and law permits plaintiffs to make enforceable legal demands 
for such responsive conduct. The demand is in one respect addressed 
to the tortfeasor, but in another respect, the state is also an addressee, 
for it is because of the state’s role that the plaintiff’s asserting this 
claim (and backing it up) is able to count as a legal reason for the de-
fendant to provide such responsive conduct. The plaintiff has a legal 
right to the state’s assistance in authenticating the validity and en-
forceability of plaintiff’s demand, and in civil tort litigation, the 
plaintiff comes to court exercising that right through the filing of a 
complaint and the expression of a prayer for such an authentica-
tion—a judgment. 
 The right to make such a demand is rooted in the right to self-
preservative, defensive, and self-restorative conduct. Similarly, a de-
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fendant’s legal vulnerability—liability—is rooted in the defendant’s 
moral accountability and moral responsibility for the wronging, the 
injuring of the plaintiff. For relational legal wrongs, the moral ac-
countability is accountability to the plaintiff. And the response typi-
cally demanded is compensating the plaintiff monetarily. The moral 
demand becomes a legal demand, which the victim has the legal power 
to make. Providing an individual who has been wronged with a right 
of action is recognizing in the individual a right to make an effective 
demand that the wrongdoer account to her for having wronged her. 
 The accountability of an injurer through tort law is an earmark of 
relational duties and relational wrongs that tort law recognizes as 
legal duties and legal wrongs. Indeed, legal actors utilize their 
knowledge of the boundaries of accountability to ascertain where and 
when there are legal duties, just as judges and lawyers do. All of 
these actors also do the opposite, however; they frequently make 
judgments about when there will be accountability, and when there 
will be a right to demand compensation, by reference to their 
knowledge of what the primary legal duties and legal rights of the 
law are. In law and in morals, our understanding and awareness of 
the primary duties and rights is intertwined with our understanding 
and awareness of rights of action and liability. It is, in some ways, 
substantially less than material equivalence, for there are affirmative 
defenses and jurisdictional limitations because of which there may be 
a legal wrong to the victim but no legal accountability; it is also, in 
some ways, an understatement to say there is simply rough congru-
ence between when there is a legal wrong and when there is legal ac-
countability, because the connections in the law itself are very close. 
However, it is an error to say that there is an analytical equivalence. 
 Courts provide persons who were wronged by others with an ave-
nue of recourse against the wrongdoer. In prior work (both on my 
own and with John Goldberg), I have sometimes elaborated on the 
idea of civil recourse in a manner that emphasized that filing a law 
suit was acting aggressively against the defendant in a manner that 
fell short of violent aggression.92 It now strikes me that this was mis-
leading and inappropriately inflammatory (even if it might, in some 
respects, be true). The better way to understand civil recourse 
through the courts is not as contrasted with violent action or no ac-
tion at all. Perhaps the better way to understand it is as being em-
powered to make an enforceable demand for responsive conduct rather 
than having no way to respond at all to having been wronged.
 As many of my examples above have suggested, those who are 
wronged in ordinary life sometimes demand responsive conduct of 
wrongdoers. Many of the cases above involve scenarios in which it is 
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not necessarily unrealistic to suppose that such demands might be 
complied with. Moreover, as a matter of suggestion and speculation, I 
indicated that there are social practices and positive norms of morali-
ty in which we individuals understand one another to be entitled to 
make utterances that are treated as demands, that serve as reasons 
to perform certain responsive conduct. 
 What the discussion above did not acknowledge is that—even if 
there are norms of positive morality under which such demands will 
be complied with—such norms are structured in ways that call upon 
personal relationships, power settings in the workplace (or interna-
tional relations), or background understandings of legal accountabil-
ity. The reality is that, assuming positive moral norms of this type 
exist at all, they are far from adequate to deal with many of the seri-
ous wrongings individuals endure at the hands of others—strangers, 
drivers, professionals, companies, landowners, government actors, 
and so on. A raw liberty to utter words expressing a demand for re-
sponsive conduct (typically compensation) is nearly worthless. 
 By making available private rights of action in tort to those who 
have been wronged, tort law meets this need. There is a way to re-
spond to having been wronged that has power. And conversely, the 
accountability or answerability for having wronged others that exists 
under positive morality and nonlegal institutions is something, but it 
does not consistently extend far and wide. The fact that victims have 
private rights of action against wrongdoers makes the wrongdoers 
accountable in a real and practical manner. 
 The Principle of Civil Recourse is best understood as saying that 
one who is wronged is entitled to have some way of responding to the 
fact of having been wronged. The grounds of the entitlement are hav-
ing been wronged, but the question we have been examining is why 
having been wronged provides a ground of entitlement to respond. 
What I have done to answer this question is to flesh out the notion of 
what the legal power to respond (through a right of action) is. It is a 
power to make an enforceable demand for ameliorative conduct from 
the wrongdoer. A demand for ameliorative or responsive conduct 
from a wrongdoer can be understood as self-restorative, self-
preservative, and self-defensive. Recall Murphy’s statement that re-
sentment “functions primarily in defense, not of all moral values and 
norms, but rather of certain values of the self.”93 Whether or not it 
arises from a feeling of resentment, a demand by a victim for amelio-
rative conduct from a wrongdoer is an act one is entitled to perform 
for reasons that relate to values of the self. In this respect, the Prin-
ciple of Civil Recourse derives from the same set of values as the 
principle that one is entitled to defend oneself against aggressors. 
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 It should be clear by now that if the Principle of Civil Recourse 
essentially articulates a right to demand ameliorative conduct of the 
defendant, it does not itself depend upon a notion of corrective jus-
tice. The defendant has a vulnerability to this demand, which means 
that if the demand is made and adequately supported, the plaintiff’s 
having made it creates a legal duty in the defendant to the plaintiff—
usually a duty to compensate the plaintiff. It is not necessarily (or 
even usually) the case that the right to demand ameliorative conduct 
in fact derives from a prior duty to compensate. The right to demand 
ameliorative conduct derives from having been wronged, in light of 
what Murphy calls values of the self.94
 Conversely, civil recourse theory does not derive from a notion of 
retributive justice, either. The plaintiff’s right is not essentially a 
right to inflict financial hardship on the defendant, in light of the in-
jury the defendant inflicted upon her. The plaintiff’s right is a right 
to demand that the defendant respond to defendant’s having wronged 
plaintiff, and to demand that the defendant ameliorate the wrongful 
injury inflicted. It is about claiming against the defendant under a 
conception of self-restoration, not a conception of anger or destruc-
tiveness or injuriousness toward others. 
 The presence of a principled understanding of the institution of 
private rights of action, along these lines, does not preclude a broader 
variety of reasons for thinking it is valuable to have this law, nor 
does it preclude recognition of shortcomings of the law. Surely, we 
see even more clearly now what a significant role the rights of action 
have in helping to articulate where the legal wrongs are and where 
accountability lies, and how tort law gives teeth to the notions of 
right and duty in the law and in ordinary social mores. These notions 
have a substantial guidance role for lawyers and nonlawyers alike. 
This is an example of the constructive justification for tort law; it is 
not the only one, but it is an important one that is easily overlooked. 
 It is possible, too, that the notion of corrective justice itself in pri-
vate law is one that is constructed through the working of tort law as 
I have just analyzed it. For if the plaintiff was wronged and makes a 
demand that the defendant compensate her, and the court adjudi-
cates the demand to be warranted and enters judgment, and the 
defendant complies with the judgment against it, the plaintiff is 
indeed compensated. She has, in a sense that is far too metaphorical 
to sustain the weight corrective justice theorists give it, restored her-
self through the legal system, by forcing the defendant to compensate 
her. That we see this occur in the tort system is one of the reasons 
we are inclined to describe it as a system that corrects injustices, or 
that does corrective justice. The capacity of a system of private 
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rights of action for wrongs to allow us to see our system as doing jus-
tice is arguably another worthwhile attribute of the system, and one 
that would fall into the constructive side of the ledger. Doing correc-
tive justice is one of many things that tort law sometimes accom-
plishes, but its capacity to do so is not basic to the account of private 
rights of action. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION
 The key idea in what I have called “substantive standing” cases in 
torts is that the wrong of which a plaintiff is complaining was a 
wrong to someone else, but not to him or her. Indeed, “substantive 
standing” was selected principally in order to signify a distinction 
from the technical legal meaning of “standing” as ordinarily used by 
lawyers, which is to a significant extent a procedural question going 
far beyond tort or any particular private law subject. When I see that 
what lies at the core of the Principle of Civil Recourse is the idea of a 
right to demand responsive conduct, I am even less surprised that 
standing is the phenomenon that drew me toward the Principle of 
Civil Recourse. For the right to demand responsive conduct that lies 
at the normative core of a right of action is fundamentally something 
the state supplies to a person who has been wronged. Empowering 
him or her—the person who was wronged—is a way of recognizing 
that he or she occupies a special place. It is a way of recognizing that 
she does have standing to complain about what the defendant did, for 
it is she who was wronged by the defendant. A legal complaint is not, 
of course, just a whine; with it comes a demand for conduct respon-
sive to the wrong that was done. 
 Although there are no doubt many different kinds of theorist’s il-
lusions in this account, there is at least one kind of illusion I hope to 
have deflated in tort theory. That is the illusion that the payment of 
compensation in tort is a way of complying with the primary duties of 
tort law. The cold hard truth about tort law is that there are many—
perhaps most—mistreatments of one person by another that cannot 
be addressed in a way that leaves plaintiffs intact. The duties not to 
mistreat by battering, negligently laming, libeling, defrauding, and 
so on, are duties whose breach very often cannot be undone. The law 
of torts does not nullify, reverse, or neutralize the mistreatment or 
the wrong. It recognizes a victim’s standing to complain about the 
wrong and to demand ameliorative conduct from the wrongdoer. 
